Seton Hall University

eRepository @ Seton Hall
Law School Student Scholarship

Seton Hall Law

2022

Normalizing the Consideration of Adverse Childhood Experiences
in Federal Sentencing Determinations
Kristen M. Kinneary

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship
Part of the Law Commons

NORMALIZING THE CONSIDERATION OF ADVERSE CHILDHOOD EXPERIENCES IN FEDERAL
SENTENCING D ETERMINATIONS
I NTRODUCTION
Beaten a lot. Hands burned. Made to kneel on rice. Struck with extension cords. This
was the unfortunate upbringing of Jorge Rivera, which one sentencing judge deemed to be only
“ordinary” childhood abuse not worthy of consideration during his sentencing. 1 Cases like Jorge
Rivera’s are unfortunately common because of an incoherent federal sentencing system, which has
failed to evolve to reflect what we now know about the significant relationship between childhood
trauma, tendencies for criminal behavior, and reduced culpability. But sentencing has profound
impacts on a defendant’s life, whether through the loss of their personal liberty or through
collateral consequences, and deficiencies in the current system cannot continue to be overlooked.
This Comment aims to show how explicit consideration of Adverse Childhood Experiences within
the United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual could result in a more coherent system by
providing for improved individualistic and humanistic determinations and giving judges more
guidance on how a defendant’s childhood trauma should factor into sentencing.
Part I of this Comment begins by defining Adverse Childhood Experiences, as a term-ofart, and discussing empirical reports that study the effects of Adverse Childhood Experiences on
human health and behavior. Then, it looks at how the study of Adverse Childhood Experiences
applies within the criminal justice system. Next, part II examines the history of the United States
Sentencing Guidelines Manual, the overarching purposes of sentencing, and the limitations of the
current federal sentencing system. Part III of this Comment analyzes several examples of federal
case law that highlight deficiencies in the system, which could be minimized through the
consideration of Adverse Childhood Experiences in sentencing determinations. Finally, Part IV

1

See U.S. v. Rivera, 192 F.3d 81, 86 (2d Cir. 1999).
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proposes an amendment to § 5H1.12 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual, which
currently restricts a sentencing court from considering an offender’s “lack of guidance as a youth”
as the basis for a departure. This part suggests that allowing for the consideration of Adverse
Childhood Experiences as a general exception to this rule will result in more consistent and just
sentencing outcomes, which will better align with the United States Sentencing Commission’s
purposes and goals. Part IV concludes by urging the United States Sentencing Commission to take
active steps to normalize the consideration of Adverse Childhood Experiences in federal
sentencing determinations.
I. ADVERSE CHILDHOOD EXPERIENCES
The study of Adverse Childhood Experiences (“ACEs”) has grown exponentially over the
past two decades. Currently, there are over 500 articles that discuss ACEs and their effects in
numerous different areas of study, including “epidemiology, neurobiology, and biomedical and
epigenetic consequences of toxic stress.”2 Utilization of ACEs in a criminal justice context,
however, is still a developing concept. This part will begin by defining “Adverse Childhood
Experiences” as a term-of-art. Then, it will consider empirical reports that study the effects of
ACEs on an individual’s heath and behavior. Last, this part will discuss the relevancy of ACEs
within the criminal justice system. The purpose of this part is not only to foster an understanding
of ACEs through discussion of the ample studies already performed, but also to call attention to
gaps in research particularly related the effects of ACEs on adult criminal offenders.

2

Jan Jeske & Mary Louis Klas, Adverse Childhood Experiences: Implications for Family Law Practice and the Family
Court System, 50 FAM. L.Q. 123, 126–27 (2016).
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A.

What Are Adverse Childhood Experiences?
ACEs are potentially traumatic events that an individual experiences before the age of

eighteen.3 They are commonly identified by some variation of the following seven categories: (1)
psychological abuse; (2) physical abuse; (3) sexual abuse; (4) witnessing violence against the
mother; (5) living with household members who were substance abusers; (6) living with household
members who were mentally ill or suicidal; (7) and living with household members who were ever
imprisoned.4 While it is unfortunately well known that there have always been adolescents who
suffer through them, the practice of categorizing and studying the health and behavioral effects of
these experiences as “Adverse Childhood Experiences” is largely a twenty-first century
phenomena.
B.

CDC-Kaiser Study
The first and most influential report on ACEs was a collaborative study conducted in 1998

by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the Kaiser Permanente healthcare company
(the “CDC-Kaiser Study” or the “Study”).5 The CDC-Kaiser Study examined the prevalence of
ACEs in over 13,000 middle-class adult Californians insured by Kaiser Permanente from 1995 to
1997.6 The Study was conducted based off self-completed questionnaires, which identified the
following as categories of ACES: (1) psychological abuse; (2) physical abuse; (3) sexual abuse;
(4) witnessing violence against the mother; (5) living with household members who were

3

Preventing Adverse Childhood Experiences, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (last updated April
6, 2021), https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/aces/fastfact.html.
4 See Vincent J. Felitti et al., Relationship of Childhood Abuse and Household Dysfunction to Many Leading Causes
of Death in Adults, 14 AM. J. OF PREVENTIVE M ED. 245, 245 (1998). Although subsequent studies have identified
other categories of ACEs, the nuances of what events should be considered as ACEs is beyond the scope of this
Comment. This purpose of this Comment is to more generally advocate for the consideration of ACEs during
sentencing. See, e.g., Melissa T. Merrick et al., Prevalence of Adverse Childhood Experiences from the Behavioral
Risk Factor Surveillance System in 23 States, 172 JAMA PEDIATRICS 1038, 1038 (2018) (including “parental
separation or divorce” as an eighth category); Michael T. Baglivio et al., The Prevalence of Adverse Childhood
Experiences (ACE) in the Lives of Juvenile Offenders, 3 J. OF JUV. JUST. 1, 1 (2014) (including “emotional neglect,”
“physical neglect,” and “parental separation or divorce” as th ree additional categories of ACEs).
5 Felitti et al., supra note 4.
6 Id.
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substance abusers; (6) living with household members who were mentally ill or suicidal; (7) and
living with household members who were ever imprisoned .7 An individual’s score was determined
using the “total number of reported ACEs measured in a binary, yes/no fashion. For example, a
positive response to a question on sexual abuse would score 1 point, whether there were one or
100 incidents.”8 The Study then compared the number of ACEs per individual to their level of
adult risky behavior, health status, and disease. 9
The CDC-Kaiser Study uncovered a strong correlation between the presence of ACEs
during adolescence and “multiple factors for several of the leading causes of death in adults.”10
Additionally, it revealed a compounding effect, such that if a person reported exposure to one
category of ACEs, they more than likely reported exposure to others. 11 In fact, “[f]or persons
reporting any single category of exposure, the probability of exposure to any additional category
ranged from 65%–93% (median: 80%); similarly, the probability of ≥ 2 additional exposures
ranged from 40%–74% (median: 54.5%).”12 The Study also found, perhaps unsurprisingly, that
as the number of ACEs reported increased, so did the likelihood for negative effects on the
individual’s health.13 For example, as compared to persons who reported no ACEs, persons who
reported four or more categories had “4- to 12-fold increased health risks for alcoholism, drug
abuse, depression, and suicide attempt; a 2- to 4-fold increase in smoking, poor self-rated health,
≥ 50 sexual intercourse partners, and sexually transmitted disease; and a 1.4- to 1.6-fold increase
in physical inactivity and sever obesity.”14 Accordingly, the presence of ACEs is significantly
linked to numerous negative physical and mental conditions as well as to risky behavior in

7

Id.
Baglivio et al., supra note 4, at 1–2.
9 Felitti et al., supra note 4.
10 Id. (including “ischemic heart disease, cancer, chronic lung disease, skeletal fractures, and liver disease” as
conditions significantly related to the presence of ACEs).
11 Id. at 249.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 245.
14 Id.
8
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adulthood.15 Thus, even though the CDC-Kaiser Study was conducted within a medical context,
it is relevant within the context of criminal justice because it shows that some people really are the
product of the environment in which they grew up.16
C.

Effect of ACEs on Adult Criminality
Since 1998, numerous reports have subsequently replicated the findings of the CDC-Kaiser

Study,17 but as the ACE phenomenon continues to grow, scholars are shifting focus from looking
at ACEs via a public health and medical standpoint to studying their effects on individual social
behavior. Most relevant to the discussion of criminal sentencing, several studies have shown a
strong correlation between the presence of ACEs and adult criminality.18 Although research on
this issue is still generally lacking, and many more studies should be conducted to highlight the
significance of the issue, the existing reports clearly support the conclusion that adults who were
abused or neglected as children are significantly more likely to be arrested as an adult —for both
violent and non-violent crimes—than those who were not.19 For example, in a 1999 study of adult
inmates and probationers, “12% of males and 25% of females reported child physical abuse, while
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Felitti et al., supra note 4, at 245.
Since the CDC-Kaiser Study, research on ACEs has expanded exponentially and scholars have begun narrowing in
on the varying effects of ACEs on different social, economic, and racial communities. For example, a 2018 study,
which included the largest and most diverse sample in an ACEs study to date (215,157 respondents from twenty-three
states), found that respondents identifying as multiracial, bisexual, and/or unable to work generally reported the
highest levels of ACE exposure. See Merrick et al., supra note 4, at 1042. While it is important to any study of ACEs
to keep in mind the disparate effects that these experiences will have on different communities, a deeper discussion
of this issue is outside the scope of this Comment.
17 See generally Baglivio et al., supra note 4; Merrick et al., supra note 4.
18 See Diana J. English et al., Childhood Victimization and Delinquency, Adult Criminality, and Violent Criminal
Behavior: A Replication and Extension 1, 33–34 (NAT’L CRIM. JUSTICE REFERENCE SERV. 2002) (finding “abused and
neglected youth were 2.7 times more likely to be arrested for a violent crime as an adult (23% versus 8.7%)”); see
also James Topitzes et al., From Child Maltreatment to Violent Offending: An Examination of Mixed -Gender and
Gender Specific Models, 27 J. I NTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 2322, 2334 (2012) (concluding childhood maltreatment
leads to “significantly higher rates of offending across all adult and lifetime indicators of violence. . . . [M]altreatment
victims [are] over twice as likely as their nonmaltreated counterparts to have any recorded violent offense,” and they
are “significantly more likely to be convicted of one or more adult non -violent . . . or violent . . . weapons charges”).
19 See English et al., supra note 18 (finding “abused and neglected youth were 2.7 times more likely to be arrested for
a violent crime as an adult (23% versus 8.7%)”); see also Topitzes et al., supra note 18 (finding childhood
maltreatment leads to “significantly higher rates of offending across all adult and lifetime indicators of violence. . . .
[M]altreatment victims [are] over twice as likely as their nonmaltreated counterparts to have any recorded violent
offense,” and they are “significantly more likely to be convicted of one or more adult non -violent . . . or violent . . .
weapons charges”).
16
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5% of males and 26% of females reported sexual molestation.”20 Another study revealed that
“[b]eing abused or neglected as a child increased the likelihood of arrest as a juvenile by 59
percent, as an adult by 28 percent, and for a violent crime by 30 percent.” 21
These studies demonstrate that trauma from ACEs does not simply go away once an
individual turns eighteen-years-old.22 Rather, “adults who survive early lifetime brutality remain
yoked to their formative experiences.”23 Because juveniles exposed to ACEs are prone to risky,
and perhaps dangerous or illegal behavior,24 it is logical that these individuals would continue to
be so prone into and throughout adulthood. More empirical research should be conducted to
document the effects of ACEs, specifically looking at adults within the criminal justice system, to
allow policymakers, judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel to make more informed decisions
relating to adults who have suffered ACEs. 25 That being said, the existing studies has established
significant enough of a correlation between the presence of ACEs and adult criminality such that
policymakers should not wait to start implementing the of the consideration of ACEs into the adult
criminal justice system.
II. I NTRODUCTION TO THE FEDERAL SENTENCING G UIDELINES

20

Jill Levenson, Adverse Childhood Experiences and Subsequent Substance Abuse in a Sample of Sexual Offenders:
Implications for Treatment and Prevention, 11 VICTIMS AND OFFENDERS 199, 202 (2015).
21 Cathy S. Wisdom & Michael G. Maxfield, An Update on the “Cycle of Violence”, in NAT ’L I NST . OF JUSTICE
RESEARCH IN BRIEF 1 (U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE 2001).
22 See, e.g., Vincent J. Felitti, The Relation Between Adverse Childhood Experiences and Adult Health: Turning Gold
into Lead, 6 PERMANENT J. 44, 44 (2002) (referencing the CDC-Kaiser Study and commenting, “[T]he time factors in
the study make it clear that time does not heal some of the adverse experiences we found so common in the childhoods
of a large population of middle-aged, middle-class Americans. One doesn’t ‘just get over’ some things”); Mitzi Baker,
Undoing the Harm of Childhood Trauma and Adversity, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA SAN FRANCISCO (Oct. 15, 2016),
https://www.ucsf.edu/news/2016/10/404446/undoing-harm-childhood-trauma-and-adversity (“Children do not
outgrow the impact of ACEs.”).
23 Miriam S. Gohara, In Defense of the Injured: How Trauma-Informed Criminal Defense Can Reform Sentencing, 45
AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 15 (2018).
24 See, e.g., Effects, THE NAT ’L C HILD TRAUMATIC STRESS NETWORK, https://www.nctsn.org/what-is-childtrauma/trauma-types/complex-trauma/effects (stating that “complexly traumatized children” are more likely to
“engage in illegal activities, such as alcohol and substance use, assaulting others, stealing, running away, and/or
prostitution,” and, therefore, they are more likely to enter the juvenile justice system as a result) [hereinafter Effects].
25 It is also worth noting that there is significantly less research that connects some ACEs, such as growing up with a
parent with mental illness, to adult criminality. Researchers should expand the scope of their work to further solidify
theories linking a ll categories of ACEs to adult criminality.
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Sentencing is arguably the most important part of the criminal justice sysytem—after all,
it often results in the deprivation of an offender’s liberty. Whether a sentence is for a period of
incarceration, suspension, or probation, a sentencing determination can have a profound impact on
the defendant’s life not only during the period of the sentence but also for years following in the
form of collateral consequences.26 While the federal sentencing system has undergone many
revisions in the past few decades, at the heart of most sentencing reform is the desire to produce
what society will perceive as a just outcome. Of course, what exactly constitutes a just outcome
is an entirely different question, to which there appears to be no single answer. Yet, establishing
comprehensive and coherent sentencing policies seems like a good place to start. This part begins
by introducing the history of sentencing practices within the United States federal courts system
and the United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual (the “Guidelines”). Then, it will briefly
discuss the overarching purposes of sentencing. Last, this part will identify and analyze several
deficiencies in the current sentencing framework, particularly in relation to the consideration of
traumatic childhood events and ACEs.

A.

Federal Sentencing: The Basics
Sentencing in the United States’ federal courts system has a long and complicated history.

Before the United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual came into effect in 1987, sentencing was
a highly discretionary process, and judges held virtually all the power. 27 But this type of sentencing
regularly resulted in “significant sentencing disparities among similarly situated offenders.”28
Consequently, major reform began to take place in the late twentieth century in response to major

26

See Welcome to the NICCC, NATIONAL I NVENTORY OF COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION,
https://niccc.nationalreentryresourcecenter.org/ (“Collateral consequences are legal and regulatory restrictions that
limit or prohibit people convicted of crimes from accessing employment, business and occupational licensing,
housing, voting, education, and other rights, benefits, and opportunities.”).
27 FEDERAL SENTENCING: THE B ASICS 2 (U.S. SENTENCING C OMM ’N 2018) [hereinafter THE B ASICS].
28 Peugh v. U.S., 569 U.S. 530, 535 (2013).
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criticism of the existing system.29 Most notably, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984 (the “SRA”), which created the Unites States Sentencing Commission (the “Commission”)—
“a bipartisan expert agency located in the judicial branch,” to enforce and regulate a new
sentencing regime.30 The SRA also gave the Commission the formidable task of establishing a
uniform set of federal sentencing guidelines and the subsequent role of overseeing and regularly
revising these guidelines.31
Thus, the Commission released the first Guidelines Manual in 1987, which contained “a
detailed set of guidelines and policy statements that included a sentencing table . . . with much
narrower sentencing ranges than the larger statutory sentencing ranges governing federal
crimes.”32

For approximately two decades following their publication, the Guidelines were

thought to impose mandatory ranges for sentences;33 however, the Supreme Court addressed this
misconception in United States v. Booker.34
In Booker, the Supreme Court held a sentencing court must consider the Guidelines’
recommended sentencing range; nevertheless, these ranges serve only an advisory purpose and are
not mandatory.35 Accordingly, while a sentencing court must consider the Guidelines, they can
“tailor the sentence in light of other statutory concerns as well.” 36

29

The Booker Court also

THE BASICS, supra note 27.
Id. (noting also Congress’ desire to “promote transparency and proportionality in sentencing”); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 991(a) (establishing the Commission as “an independent commission to the judicial branch”); 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)
(stating the purpose of the Commission is to “establish senten cing policies and practices for the Federal criminal
justice system”); 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1) (instructing the Commission to “promulgate and distribute . . . guidelines . . .
for the use of a sentencing court in determining the sentence to be imposed in a c riminal case”).
31 THE B ASICS, supra note 27.
32 Id. at 3–4 (commenting that “[b]efore the initial set of guidelines was promulgated, Congress also enacted statutes
creating mandatory minimum penalties for several commonly prosecuted drug-trafficking and firearms offenses and
prohibiting probation for certain offenders.”). It important to note the existence of statutory mandatory minimums
and their inescapable effects on sentencing. That being said, mandatory minimums are a complex subject, which are
outside the scope of this Comment. This Comment is confined to instances in which a sentencing judge could utilize
their discretionary powers.
33 See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S 466 (2000).
34 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
35 Id. at 245–46.
36 Id.
30
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established a three-step process for judges to use when determining a sentence.37 A sentencing
judge must “(1) properly determine the guidelines range, (2) determine whether to depart based on
the Sentencing Commission’s policy statements, and (3) determine whether to vary based on
statutory factors.”38 Lastly, the Booker Court determined sentencing appeals would be reviewed
under a standard of “unreasonableness.”39
To determine a recommended sentencing range, the Guidelines provide essentially a grid
system in which, like other grid sentencing systems, “an offender’s prior convictions and the
perceived severity of the crime hold the most weight in determining his or her penalty.”40
However, the Guidelines establish dozens of other considerations that can impact a sentencing
determination.41 Furthermore, the Booker standard has afforded sentencing judges a great degree
of deference such that the sentencing judge can consider any information regarding a defendant’s
background, character, and conduct when imposing a sentence, particularly when considering
whether to stay within or go outside of the Guidelines’ recommended range.42
When a sentencing judge imposes a sentence outside of the Guidelines’ recommended
range, they do so through either a “departure” or a “variance.”43

Departures are statutorily

authorized and provide for “adjustments to a sentencing range within the guideline system,”44 such

37

Avi Muller, Comment, From ACEs to Fetal Trauma: How Slippery is Slope of Discretionary Sentencing Factors?,
51 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1389, 1394–95 (2021); see PRIMER DEPARTURES AND VARIANCES 2–3 (U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N 2019) [hereinafter PRIMER].
38 Muller, supra note 37.
39 Booker, 543 U.S. at 261; see also Rita v. U.S., 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007) (explaining that under Booker’s
“reasonableness” standard, an appellate court will consider “whether the trial court abused its discretion ”); U.S. v.
Grossman, 513 F.3d 592, 595 (2008) (“[D]istrict court judges are involved in an exercise of judgment, not a ritual.”).
40 Mirko Bagaric et al., Trauma and Sentencing: The Case for Mitigating Penalty for Childhood Physical and Sexual
Abuse, 30 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 9 (2019)
41 Id. at 9–10.
42 PRIMER, supra note 37, at 1; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3661. For a brief overview of how a sentencing court determines
the appropriate Guidelines range, see generally Muller, supra note 37, at 1395–96.
43 PRIMER, supra note 37.
44 Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
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that a higher (upward departure45 ) or lower (downward departure46 ) sentence can be imposed.47
Departures are meant to compensate for the Guidelines’ general inability to consider human
behavior on an individual basis, such that they are “frequently triggered by a prosecution request
to reward cooperation . . . or by other factors that take the case ‘outside the heartland’ contemplated
by the Sentencing Commission.”48 In the context of considering trauma, for example, § 5H1.3 of
the Guidelines provides that mental and emotional conditions may be considered in determining
whether a departure is warranted, but only to extent that such conditions are “present to an unusual
degree and distinguish the case from the typical cases covered by the guidelines.”49 Additionally,
§ 5H1.12 provides that “[l]ack of guidance as a youth and similar circumstances indicating a
disadvantage upbringing are not relevant grounds in determining whether a departure is
warranted.”50 Subsequent legislation, as well as the Commission itself, have further advised
sentencing judges to use departures sparingly, and have recommended limiting departures to
exceptional or atypical cases.51
In contrast to departures, a variance is not subject to the Guidelines analysis.52 A variance
“occurs when a judge imposes a sentence above or below the otherwise properly calculated final

Id. at 6 (“An upward departure may be warranted if reliable information indicates that the defendant’s criminal
history category substantially underrepresents the seriousness of the defendant’s criminal history or the likelihood that
the defendant will commit other crimes.” (quotation omitted)).
46 Id. at 8 (“[A] downward departure may be warranted if reliable information indicates that the defen dant’s criminal
history category substantially over-represents the seriousness of the defendant’s criminal history of the likelihood that
the defendant will commit other crimes.” (quotation omitted) (alteration in original omitted)).
47 Id. at 5–8.
48 U.S. v. Rangel, 697 F.3d 795, 801 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing U.S. v. Cruz-Perez, 567 F.3d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir. 2009));
see also PRIMER, supra note 37, at 5.
49 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES M ANUAL § 5H1.3 (U.S. SENTENCING C OMM ’N 2018) [hereinafter USSG].
A
departure on this ground, however, is discouraged, and a causal connection between the condition and the criminal
conduct must be established. See PRIMER, supra note 37, at 34–35.
50 USSG, supra note 49, at § 5H1.12.
51 PRIMER, supra note 37, at 5–6; see, e.g., Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children
Today Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 109-21, title IV § 401 (2003) (instructing the Commission to “ensure that the incidence
of downward departures are substantially reduced”).
52 PRIMER, supra note 37, at 34–35.
45
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sentencing range based on application of the other statutory factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).”53 This
distinction between departures and variances sometimes leads to a judge issuing a variance and a
departure within the same sentence.54 The ability for a sentencing court to vary is important
because it preserves the court’s “ultimate ability to impose, regardless of what the guideline range
is found to be, a sentence that it views is ‘sufficient, but not greater than necessary’ to serve the
goals of sentencing.”55
B.

Goals of Sentencing
One’s perception of the purpose of sentencing likely depends on what theory of punishment

they ascribe to: retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, or rehabilitation. 56 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),
however, suggests that that consideration of all four theories is necessary to achieve a just result .
For example, the statute instructs a sentencing court consider, amongst other things, the need for
the sentence imposed (1) “to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law,
and to provide just punishment for the offense”; (2) “to afford adequate deterrence to criminal
conduct”; (3) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant”; and (4) “to provide the
defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional

Id. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) lists the following factors to be considered by the sentencing judge: (1) “the nature and
circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant”; (2) “the need for the sentence
imposed”; (3) “the kinds of sentences available”; (4) “the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established”; (5)
“any pertinent policy statement”; (6) “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with
similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct”; and (7) “the need to provide restitution to any victims
of the offense.”
54 PRIMER, supra note 37, at 43; see, e.g., U.S. v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 317 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Although a departure or
a variance could, in the end, lead to the same outcome . . . it is important for sentencing courts to distinguish between
the two, as departures are subject to different requirements than variances.”).
55 PRIMER, supra note 37, at 43 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)).
56 See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 71 (2010) (referring to “retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation” interchangeably as “penological justifications” and “goals of penal sanctions”); accord STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY, “LEGAL PUNISHMENT ” (2001)
(revised
July
18,
2017),
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-punishment/ (defining “retribution” as justifying punishment as an
“intrinsically appropriate, because deserved, response to wrongdoing,” and “incapacitation” as justifying punishment
as a means to preempt an offender’s future choices by incapacitating them); Anthony Ellis, A Deterrence Theory of
Punishment, 53 PHIL. Q. 337, 337 (2003) (defining “deterrence” as justifying punishment “as a means to discourage
others from committing similar crimes”); Francis T. Cullen & Paul Gendreau, Assessing Correctional Policy Practice,
and Prospects, 3 CRIM. JUST. 109, 112 (2000), https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/lbrr/archives/cnmcs-plcng/cn34984-v3109-175-eng.pdf (defining “rehabilitation” as justifying punishment as a means to “make the offender less likely to
break the law in the future”).
53
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treatment in the most effective manner.”57 Yet, issuing a sentence to align with one, or even all
four theories, is not enough to justify its imposition. “Even if the punishment has some connection
to a valid penological goal, it must be shown that the punishment is not grossly disproportionate
in light of the justification offered.”58 Thus, sentencing courts are increasingly trying to consider
more humanistic factors in sentencing determinations, particularly traumatic childhood events that
may have had lasting effects on the individual offender.
C.

The Guidelines’ Limitations
The current sentencing framework that is applied in the federal courts system does not

adequately account for ACEs and their lasting physical and psychological impact on adult
offenders. Take, for example, the apparent inconsistencies between several of the Guidelines’
sections discussed above. First, § 5H1.3 states that “mental and emotional conditions are not
ordinarily relevant in determining whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline
range, except as provided in” subpart 5K2.59 Then, subpart 5K2 provides that diminished mental
capacity may be a basis for downward departure but only in certain instances.60 The Guidelines,
however, do not provide any explanation as to what constitutes such “certain instances.”
Furthermore, it is generally established outside of the Guidelines that traumatic childhood events
could result in an individual, whether in adolescence or adulthood, experiencing negative mental
and emotional conditions.61 Yet § 5H1.12—which provides that “lack of guidance as a youth”
cannot form the basis for a departure—seems to shut the door on considering these events. 62

57

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).
Graham v. Florida , 560 U.S. 48, 72 (2010); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (stating a sentence should be “sufficient,
but not greater than necessary”).
59 USSG, supra note 49, at § 5H1.3 (emphasis added).
60 Id. at § 5K2.13.
61 See, e.g., Effects, supra note 24.
62 USSG, supra note 49, at § 5H1.12.
58
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This interplay between different sections of the Guidelines is confusing and has constructed
high hurdles for judges who want to consider traumatic childhood events to issue a downward
departure. Consequently, sentencing courts have gone to great lengths, even prior to Booker, to
effectively amend § 5H1.12 through precedent to create an exception for cases where the offender
suffered “extreme childhood abuse.” For example, in United States v. Pullen, the Seventh Circuit
noted:
[S]ection 5H1.3 has the weasel word “ordinarily,” implying that in an extraordinary
case a mental or emotional condition might warrant a lighter sentence even if it did
not fit the express exception in 5K2.13. And the “similar circumstances” to which
section 5H1.12 refers might not be thought to encompass childhood sexual abuse
by a parent, which is not all that similar to the sort of parental neglect, rather than
abuse, conjured up by the term “lack of guidance.”63
This push to consider childhood abuse in sentencing is likely the result of sentencing judges
acknowledging the profound impacts that trauma can have on an individual through childhood and
into adulthood and recognizing that imposing a sentence within the Guidelines’ range may be
“grossly disproportionate” given the offender’s reduced culpability. However, this framework for
issuing departures based on “extreme childhood abuse” neglects consideration other ACEs, such
as growing up with a parent who was incarcerated or with a parent who was a substance abuser,
that have been similarly linked to negative health outcomes and risky behavior in adulthood.64

63

U.S. v. Pullen, 89 F.3d 368, 371 (7th Cir. 1996); see also U.S. v. Walter, 256 F.3d 891, 895 (9th Cir. 2001) (limiting
the consideration of the psychological effects of childhood abuse to instances where such abuse was “extraordinary”);
U.S. v. Rivera, 192 F.3d 81, 85 (2d Cir. 1999) (recognizing that “abuse suffered during childhood --at some level of
severity--can impair a person’s mental and emotion conditions,” but inadvertently setting a seemingly high standard
for what that level is).
64 See infra Part I. This is not to say however, that judges have never considered “lack of guidance” as significant in
determining a sentence. In fact, more and more judges are issuing downward departures on this ground despite the
Guidelines’ prohibition on doing so, but it is still far from the norm. See, e.g., U.S. v. Bettin, No. CR 17-093-BLGSPW, 2019 WL 3778461, at *2 (D. Mont. Aug. 12, 2019) (issuing a downward departure based largely on the
offender’s “serious lack of guidance as a youth”); AMY BARON-EVANS & JENNIFER NILES COFFIN, NO M ORE M ATH
WITHOUT SUBTRACTION: DECONSTRUCTING THE GUIDELINES’ PROHIBITIONS AND RESTRICTIONS ON M ITIGATING
FACTORS 150 (2010), https://fln.fd.org/files/training/no-more-mathwithout-subtraction.pdf (“After Booker, there is no
longer any need to show extreme abuse or neglect to avoid the prohibitions of § 5H1.12, and courts have begun to
consider disadvantaged youth or lack of guidance as a youth as a factor for sentencing below the guideline range.”) .
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The incoherency is further exaggerated when the Guidelines are compared with statutory
instructions to sentencing courts. Particularly, 18 U.S.C. § 3661 provides, “No limitation shall be
placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted
of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of
imposing an appropriate sentence.” Similarly, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) instructs a sentencing court
to look at the “history and characteristics of the defendant.” 65 These statutes are often cited when
a sentencing court issues a variance that would otherwise be prohibited as a departure based on
provisions of the Guidelines. Thus, they support the conclusion that the Guidelines do not address
all factors that sentencing courts find important in issuing a just sentencing determination. This is
particularly so when studies suggest that variance away from, rather than adherence to, the
Guidelines’ recommended range has become the norm. 66 This evidences the need to amend the
current sentencing framework to align with how the rules and regulations are actually being
applied by sentencing courts.
III. ACES AND CURRENT CASE LAW
Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor said it best in her concurrence in the 1987
case of California v. Brown: “[E]vidence about the defendant’s background and character is
relevant because of the belief, long held by this society, that defendants who commit criminal acts
that are attributable to a disadvantaged background, or to emotional and mental problems, may be
less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.” 67

Although the Commission has

In full, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) instructs the sentencing court to consider: (1) “the nature and circumstances of the
offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant”; (2) “the need for the sentence imposed”; (3) “the kinds
of sentences available”; (4) “the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established”; (5) “any pertinent polic y
statement”; (6) “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have
been found guilty of similar conduct”; and (7) “the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense. ” Yet, §
3553(a)(1) is most significant to the discussion of considering ACEs, and is, therefore, focused on for the purposes of
this Comment.
66 See Muller, supra note 37, at 1399 (“In 2018, 51% of sentences were within the Guidelines range, 2.6% above the
range, and a total of 46.5% below the range. Of those sentences below the Guidelines range, 26.5% were government
sponsored, and 20% were non-government sponsored.”).
67 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
65
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attempted to control the sentencing process through the issuance of the Guidelines, studies show
that judges have become more comfortable with issuing sentences outside of, particularly below,
the Guidelines’ recommended range since Booker.68 These studies highlight two things: First, that
judges are likely happy to have their discretion back. Second, there are obvious flaws in the
Guidelines that, in many cases, would lead to unjust results if the Guidelines’ recommended ranges
were strictly followed. This is significant because judges appear to be more and more likely to
consider childhood trauma in their sentencing decisions. For example, one survey of district
judges on the Guidelines represented that over 60% of the judges polled “believe more emphasis
should be placed on mental conditions when determining sentences.” 69
This section will start by presenting federal cases in which the offender’s childhood trauma
was discussed by the sentencing court. Then, it will analyze those cases to draw attention to the
existing deficencies in the current sentencing framework and it will begin to introduce how
consideration of ACEs could address those deficiencies.
A.

Case Studies
In United States v. McBride, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a downward variance, which

reduced a defendant’s sentence to nearly half of the Guidelines’ recommended range.70 The court
did this after the sentencing judge found the defendant’s history of consistent abuse and
abandonment by his family to be one of the worst that the court had ever seen. 71 In that case, the
defendant was charged with distributing child pornography—he was found with 981 images and

See Muller, supra note 37, at 1399 (“In 2018, 51% of sentences were within the Guidelines ra nge, 2.6% above the
range, and a total of 46.5% below the range. Of those sentences below the Guidelines range, 26.5% were government
sponsored, and 20% were non-government sponsored.”); see generally U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION FINAL
QUARTERLY DATA REPORT (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2006); U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION FINAL QUARTERLY
DATA REPORT (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2018).
69 U.S. SENTENCING C OMM ’N’S SURVEY OF ARTICLE III JUDGES, app. B, B-8 (U.S. SENTENCING C OMM ’N 2002),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-andpublications/research-projects-andsurveys/surveys/20021202_Judge_Survey.pdf.
70 511 F.3d 1293, 1298 (11th Cir. 2007).
71 Id.
68
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45 videos of child pornography in his home.72 In the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”),
the probation officer calculated the Guidelines’ recommended range as 151 to 168 months’
imprisonment.73

Further, “[t]he offense carried a statutory maximum sentence of 20 years’

imprisonment and a minimum sentence of 5 years’ imprisonment,” as well as the maximum term
of supervised release being life, with the minimum set at two years. 74
In making its sentencing determination, however, the sentencing court used 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a) to consider many details of the defendant’s personal history—including that his father was
murdered when the defendant was only two years old, “his mother and uncle physically abused
him, his grandfather sexually abused him” for approximately ten years, and he was transferred in
and out of foster care from the age of twelve until adulthood.75 The sentencing court determined
that these traumatic events warranted a downward variance and imposed a sentence of “84 months’
imprisonment followed by a ten-year period of supervised release,” because the defendant could
then benefit from participation in a sexual treatment program.76 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed,
finding that this sentence was not substantively unreasonable and the sentencing court did not
commit clear error in placing such weight on the defendant’s history in issuing a sentence
considerably less than the recommended range.77
Several years later in United States v. Carpenter, the Eleventh Circuit heard another case
on appeal in which the sentencing court considered the defendant’s own abuse as a child in making
its sentencing determination—including that the defendant grew up with an alcoholic mother and
a physically abusive stepfather.78 In Carpenter, however, the sentencing court did not vary or
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Id. at 1295.
Id.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 1295–96.
76 McBride, 511 F.3d at 1296.
77 Id. at 1298.
78 803 F.3d 1224, 1233 (11th Cir. 2015).
73
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depart from the recommended range, but instead used the defendant’s own abuse to justify
imposing the very lowest end of the recommended range. 79 The Eleventh Circuit again affirmed
the sentencing court’s decision as reasonable.80
The Ninth Circuit has also addressed the significance of childhood trauma in sentencing
determinations. For example, in United States v. Walter, the Ninth Circuit reversed a district
court’s sentencing determination where the district court did not sufficiently consider the
defendant’s childhood abuse.81 In that case, the defendant sent a threatening letter to thenPresident Clinton and signed the name of an individual on whom he wished to get revenge. 82 “The
guidelines under which [the defendant] was sentenced set[] forth a range from 41–51 months.”83
The defendant argued that he should receive a downward departure based on his extraordinary
history of childhood abuse, either independently or under § 5K2.13 for diminished capacity.84 The
district court denied a downward departure on either ground and imposed a 41-month sentence.85
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit looked to § 5K2.13 for guidance. While it recognized that
this section generally prohibited consideration of mental and emotional conditions, and that the
court previously held this section generally includes “the impact of child abuse on the offender,”
the Ninth Circuit determined that the defendant’s history of abuse was extraordinary and warranted
downward departure under this provision.86 Particularly, the court considered “[t]he combination
of brutal beatings by [the defendant’s] father, the introduction of drugs and alcohol by his mother,
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Id. at 1230–32.
Id.
81 256 F.3d 891, 895 (9th Cir. 2001).
82 Id. at 893.
83 Id. at 893 n.1.
84 Id. at 893.
85 Id. at 894 (“The [district] court refused to grant a downward departure on the grounds of childhood abuse because
when [the defendant] was thirteen years old, he struck back, knocking his father down when the latter attempted to
assault him. This suggested to the court that ‘he was able to fend for himself.’”).
86 Id. at 895.
80
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and, most seriously, the sexual abuse he faced at the hands of his cousin.” 87 Accordingly, the
Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, ordering the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing
to properly consider the defendant’s claims of childhood abuse.88
As a final example,89 it is important to note a case in which an offender’s upbringing seems
to have been inadequately considered. In United States v. Rivera, the Second Circuit heard an
appeal from a defendant who was convicted of conspiracy to distribute narcotics. 90 The defendant
appealed his sentence arguing that the district court erred by “failing to depart downward from the
Sentencing Guidelines range by reason of [the defendant’s] violent and tumultuous childhood.”91
The defendant based his appeal on § 5K2.13, arguing that this section permitted a downward
departure in instances of childhood abuse such as that which he suffered. He had set forth evidence
that “he was born of a familial rape . . . he spent time in foster homes . . . and his stepfather was
killed when [the defendant] was eight.”92 The district court, however, determined that these facts
evidenced only that the defendant suffered lack of guidance as a youth, a consideration which §
5H1.12 prohibited.93 The defendant also presented evidence that reported he was badly beaten as
a child, and that he “[had] his hands burned, [was] made to kneel on rice in the corner, and [was]
struck with extension cords.”94 The district court was also not persuaded that these incidents arose

Walter, 256 F.3d at 895 (disagreeing also with the district court’s finding that Walter’s defense against his father in
away casted doubt on his abuse).
88 Id.
89 For more examples, see generally U.S. v. Sawyer, 907 F.3d 121, 123 (2d Cir. 2018) (reversing a sentence of 30
years’ imprisonment after finding that the sentence was “shockingly high given [the defendant’s] harrowing
upbringing and comparatively low danger to the community,” but affirming a 25-year sentence); U.S. v. Phillips, 461
F. App’x 135, 141 (3d Cir. 2012) (refraining from imposing an upward variance during sentencing, despite the
defendant being eligible for one, because of the extreme abuse the defendant suffered as a child); U.S. v. Bettin, No.
CR 17-093-BLG-SPW, 2019 WL 3778461, at *2 (D. Mont. Aug. 12, 2019) (exemplifying a case where a decreased
sentence was issued based, in part, on “serious lack of guidance as a youth”). But see U.S. v. Godinez, 474 F.3d 1039,
1043 (8th Cir. 2007) (upholding the denial of a downward departure, which was sought based on facts including that
the defendant “lost his father at the age of twelve, was unable to attend school, and remained illiterate until late
adolescence” because the court found those life circumstances were not unusual).
90 192 F.3d 81, 83 (2d Cir. 1999).
91 Id. (quotation omitted).
92 Id. at 86.
93 Id.
94 Id. (quotation omitted).
87
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to the level of extraordinary abuse that could be assumed to cause mental or emotional pathology
that would warrant a departure under § 5K2.13.95
Last, in deciding to affirm the district court’s sentencing determination, the Second Circuit
commented on the prevalence of histories of child abuse in the lives of criminal defendants, such
that it would be impractical to issue decreased sentences in each and every case. 96 Although the
Second Circuit declined to set a standard for determining at what point “extraordinary” childhood
abuse exists (such that it would warrant a downward departure), it held that the defendant presented
no such case.97
B.

What Do These Cases Show?
Existing case law demonstrates that the current federal sentencing framework is deficient,

particularly when applied to offenders who have suffered what are now coined as ACs. It seems
apparent that sentencing judges across all circuits are generally comfortable exercising their
discretion and straying from the Guidelines’ recommend range to consider childhood trauma as a
significant mitigating factor.

Yet, the aforementioned cases also exemplify that there are

significant discrepancies between how different courts view and categorize childhood trauma. For
example, while the Eight Circuit has refused to allow a downward departure where the offender
“lost his father at the age of twelve, was unable to attend school, and remained illiterate until late
adolescence,”98 other courts may allow such a departure if they recognize general “lack of
guidance as a youth” as a sufficient mitigating factor. 99
In the context of ACEs more specifically, there are apparent inconsistencies amongst
judges as to what constitutes childhood abuse. By drawing a line at “extraordinary abuse,” the
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Rivera, 192 F.3d at 86.
97 Id.
98 Godinez, 474 F.3d at 1043.
99 See, e.g., Bettin, No. CR 17-093-BLG-SPW, 2019 WL 3778461, at *2 (exemplifying a case where a decreased
sentence was issued based, in part, on “serious lack of guidance as a youth”).
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negative implication is that there is such thing as “ordinary abuse.” Perhaps, neglect may even fall
into this category of “ordinary abuse.”100 However, drawing the line here too quickly disregards
studies that have included childhood emotional and physical neglect as ACEs, and that have found
such neglect to result in serious negative health and behavioral consequences.101 Accordingly,
apparent deficiencies in the Guidelines, federal sentencing statutes, and in case law, all support the
conclusion that explicitly providing for the consideration of ACEs into a sentencing determination
would lead to fairer and more consistent sentencing outcomes.

IV. A DDING IN ACES
As a result of the incoherency in the way sentencing courts consider an offender’s
childhood trauma, the federal sentencing regime appears to be reverting to a fully discretionary
process, such as it was prior to the SRA. However, as has already been discovered, fully
discretionary processes come with significant downfalls, such as inconsistency and unpredictable
outcomes. To prevent revision back to an ineffective system, it is necessary to achieve doctrinal
coherency between the Guidelines and the statutory sentencing framework. This part seeks to
address how this can be accomplished within the context of ACEs by making two
recommendations. First, this part will propose amending § 5H1.12 to permit the consideration of
ACEs as grounds for a departure. It will suggest that this amendment would result in more
consistent and just sentencing outcomes that will better align with the Commission’s stated

See, e.g., Rivera, 192 F.3d at 86 (declining to find the defendant’s abuse as a child to be a “significant and mitigating
factor in his subsequent behavior and poor exercise of judgment” because “as much could be said of every criminal
defendant who has suffered abuse as a child, or corporal punishment at the hands of benighted parents”).
101 See, e.g., Baglivio et al., supra note 4, at 1 (including “emotional neglect” and “physical neglect” as categories of
ACEs); See English et al., supra note18, at 33–34 (finding “abused and neglected youth were 2.7 times more likely to
be arrested for a violent crime as an adult (23% versus 8.7%)” (emphasis added)); Wisdom & Maxfield, supra note
21, at 1 (“Being abused or neglected as a child increased the likelihood of arrest as a juvenile by 59 percent, as an
adult by 28 percent, and for a violent crime by 30 percent.” (emphasis added)).
100
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purposes and goals. Then, this part will urge the Commission to take active steps aimed at
normalizing the consideration of ACEs in federal sentencing determinations.
A.

Amending § 5H1.12 to Create and Exception for ACEs
As a first step to addressing the Guidelines’ defectiveness with respect to addressing an

offender’s childhood trauma, the Commission should amend § 5H1.12—which currently provides
that “[l]ack of guidance as a youth and similar circumstances indicating a disadvantaged
upbringing are not relevant grounds in determining whether a departure is warranted”—to include
an exception for ACEs.102 Such an amendment may look like the following:
Lack of guidance as a youth and similar circumstances indicating a disad vantaged
upbringing are not relevant grounds in determining whether a departure is
warranted except as provided for by this section. Except, the presence of Adverse
Childhood Experiences may be relevant in determining whether a departure is
warranted.
The following are recognized as Adverse Childhood Experiences to be considered:
(1) psychological abuse; (2) physical abuse; (3) sexual abuse; (4) violence against
mother; (5) living with household members who were substance abusers; (6) living
with household members who were mentally ill or suicidal; (7) and living with
household members who were ever imprisoned.
Amending § 5H1.12 to permit consideration of ACEs in determining whether a departure
is warranted would promote the Commission’s stated purposes and goals, ultimately resulting in a
more coherent sentencing framework. First, as previously discussed, the SRA originally tasked
the Commission with establishing a set of uniform sentencing guidelines in attempt to reduce
inconsistent determinations.103 However, a significant number of federal judgements appear to
disagree with the Guidelines as they are currently written, particularly in the context of considering
an offender’s childhood trauma. For example, a 2010 survey from the Commission of federal
judges revealed that approximately 49% of judges believe that lack of guidance as a youth “should
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USSG, supra note 49, at § 5H1.12.
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see infra Part II.A.
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be ordinarily relevant to the determination of a sentence outside the guideline range.”104
Consequently, sentencing courts are increasingly resorting to other means to issue the sentence
that they ultimately feel fairly considers the offender’s background—either through mixing and
matching other provisions of the Guidelines or through issuance of a variance based on § 3661 or
§ 3553(a)(1).105 Because judges are taking different incoherent approaches, inconsistent sentences
are still being issued.
Take, for example, two of the cases discussed above, both within the Eleventh Circuit:
United States v. McBride106 and United States v. Carpenter.107

In McBride, the defendant

evidenced that his mother and uncle physically abused him, and that his grandfather sexually
abused for approximately ten years108 —both unfortunate circumstances would certainly constitute
ACEs. The sentencing judge in that case decided to utilize his discretion to issue a downward
variance based off 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).109 As a result, the defendant’s sentence was reduced to
nearly half of the Guidelines’ recommended range. The defendant in Carpenter was similarly
victimized by a physically abusive stepfather110 —another circumstance that would constitute an
ACE. The sentencing court in Carpenter, however, determined that such abuse did not warrant
departure and it additionally chose not to vary. 111 Instead, the defendant was sentenced within the
Guideline’s range.112
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AMY BARON-EVANS & PAUL H OFER, LITIGATING M ITIGATING FACTORS: DEPARTURES, VARIANCES, AND
ALTERNATIVES
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(2010),
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itigating_Mitigating_Factors.pdf.
105 See, e.g., U.S. v. McBride, 511 F.3d 1293, 1298 (11th Cir. 2007) (affirming a downward variance issued based on
consideration of the defendant’s history of consistent childhood abuse and abandonment by his family); U.S. v. Walter,
256 F.3d 891, 895 (reversing a sentencing determination because the district court did not adequately consider the
defendant’s childhood a buse under § 5K2.13).
106 511 F.3d 1293 (11 Cir. 2007).
107 803 F.3d 1224 (11 Cir. 2105).
108 McBride, 511 F.3d at 1295–1296.
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This disparity in sentencing could be reduced if the Commission amended § 5H1.12 to
permit consideration of ACEs in determining whether a departure is warranted. This is because
judges who want to issue a lighter sentence due to the defendant’s childhood or apparent reduced
culpability, would have a direct provision to cite to in doing so. To the extent that sentencing
courts are simply maneuvering around § 5H1.12 to achieve the desired sentence, a more coherent
sentencing framework could achieve by providing further guidance on what constitutes mere “lack
of guidance” versus something more serious that should be considered as mitigating against
culpability, such as ACEs. Furthermore, because sentencing determinations are reviewed based
on an abuse of discretion standard, it is conceivable that judges, such as the judge in Carpenter,
may be hesitant to issuance a variance where ACEs are not explicitly defined as a mitigating factor.
If judges could cite to a specific provision in the Guidelines allowing for the consideration of
ACEs, it is less likely that their sentencing determination would be overturned.
Second, in addition to promoting a uniform sentencing practice, the Commission is also
under a duty to regularly revise the Guidelines to ensure that the “sentencing, penal, and
correctional practices are effective in meeting the purposes of sentencing.” 113 As discussed above,
the purposes of sentencing include the need for the sentence imposed (1) “to reflect the seriousness
of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense”; (2)
“to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct”; (3) to protect the public from further crimes
of the defendant”; and (4) “to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training,
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.” 114 Yet, providing “just
punishment for the offense” is not possible if the Commission continues promoting a set of
guidelines that do not sufficiently account for individualized human considerations.

“A key

consideration that underpins the criminal law and sentencing is culpability. In order for individuals
113
114

28 U.S.C. § 991(b).
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2); see infra Part II.B.
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to be culpable for their behavior, they need to be responsible for it, which assumes a capacity to
make decisions that do not violate the criminal law.” 115 However, ACEs “that delay or interfere
with the development of sound cognitive or emotional judgment militate against the capacity for
individuals to make prudent choices.”116 Therefore, ACEs should be explicitly recognized within
the Guidelines as warranting a departure.
For example, the decision in United States v. Rivera seems starkly unsatisfactory. Had the
sentencing judge in that case been given more explicit guidance, it is more than possible that they
would have considered a defendant who, as a child, was badly beaten, “[had] his hands burned,
[was] made to kneel on rice in the corner, and [was] struck with extension cords,” to have suffered
ACEs. The proposed amendment could potentially relieve some of the harsh responsibility placed
on sentencing judges to determine what constitutes “extraordinary” child abuse allowing for a
departure under § 5K2.13.117
Importantly, Rivera also highlights the fact that just like a sentencing court has the
discretion to consider a defendant’s background and the presence of ACEs based off 18 U.S.C. §
3661 or 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), it also has the discretion not to do so. While amending § 5H1.12 to
allow the consideration of ACEs will not change the advisory nature of the Guidelines, adding an
explicit requirement that the sentencing judge at least consider ACEs may encourage more judges
to depart based off their presence. It may also alleviate the burden of judges to decide whether
they want to go “off the books” and utilize discretion, particularly in a system where a judge who
utilizes too much discretion is not always looked upon favorably.

Bagaric et al., supra note 40, at 3; see also California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (“[E]vidence about the defendant’s background and character is relevant because of the belief, long held
by this society, that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged background, or to
emotional and mental problems, may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.”).
116 Id.
117 192 F.3d 81, 86 (2d Cir. 1999) (quotation omitted) (noting also that the defendant was born of a familial rape, spent
time in foster homes, and that the defendant’s stepfather was killed when the defendant was eight).
115
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Considering the presence of ACEs as legally relevant in a sentencing determination could
also reduce recidivism rates and lead to more effective possibilities of rehabilitation. While a
larger discussion of recidivism rates and rehabilitation efforts is outside the scope of this Comment,
it is worth briefly noting how consideration of ACEs may fit into that discussion. Particularly,
studies are starting to be performed within the context of the juvenile justice system, which may
be helpful by analogy. For example, a 2015 study found that adolescents “who reported a greater
number of ACEs were significantly more likely to be re-arrested earlier in the follow-up period.”118
This finding was true for all genders and races. 119 Nonetheless, the authors of the study noted a
concerning lack of research on this relationship, but stated the ACEs studies that have been
performed support to the connection.120 Research addressing this relationship in the context of
adult offenders is even slimer and is in need of more consideration; however, the research that has
been completed draws similar conclusions.121 Thus, it is likely that further research would only
cement the correlation between increased presence of ACEs and higher recidivism rates.
Furthermore, because of the relationship between ACEs and the likelihood for risky
behavior in adulthood, it would be beneficial for any rehabilitation service to account for the
offenders’ trauma—whether rehabilitation is attempted during incarceration or after release. First,
“to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other
correctional treatment in the most effective manner,” a sentencing court needs to approach the
offender as an individual; this includes taking his background and upbringing into consideration.
Additionally, cases such as United States v. McBride, exemplify how consideration of ACEs in
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121 See infra Part I.C.
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sentencing could lead to reduced sentences, which in turn could provide the defendant with an
opportunity to participate in treatment programs following their period of incarceration.122
Although the Commission’s two goals—allowing for a more humanistic approach to
sentencing while also providing uniformity—may appear to be in conflict, the proposed
amendment offers a solution that could effectively achieve both.

B.

The Commission’s Continuing Duties
In addition to adopting the proposed amendment to § 5H1.12, the Commission should take

several active steps to normalize the consideration of ACEs in sentencing. First, the Commission
will need to begin by deciding what conditions constitute ACEs, such that they should be included
in the proposed amendment. By amending § 5H1.12 to provide for ACEs rather than “trauma”
more generally, the Commission would be increasing coherency between the Guidelines and the
statutory sentencing framework without being too obscure. Although the seven categories listed
in the proposed amendment are the most seminal categories, 123 the Commission should confirm
that these categories will be inclusive enough to align with the purposes of sentencing and to reduce
inconsistent sentencing. While requiring the Commission to set definite categories within an
amended § 5H1.12 may lead to the exclusion of conditions that some research may consider as
ACEs, such as physical or emotional neglect, this is an unfortunate, but necessary consequence to
achieve more uniformity. Additionally, even with the amendment, the Guidelines will continue to
serve only an advisory purpose and a sentencing court may continue to consider other traumatic
experiences under their discretion.
ACEs in and of themselves, however, can be seen as transitional categories—what
constitutes physical abuse to one, may not to another. Accordingly, once the Commission
122
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determines the categories to be included, it must also construct definitions for each category. For
example, to provide guidance on what constitutes physical abuse, the Commission might look at
case law in which a parent is charged or convicted for being abusive to their child and construct a
definition based on a common standard. As another example, the Commission might determine
that the threshold for living with a mentally ill parent can only be reached where that parent has
been professionally diagnosed with a recognized illness. The Commission must do this, again, to
limit any potential obscurity—particularly given that a limitation to ACEs is that they are largely
self-reported.
Last, the Commission should stay up to date on new empirical research on ACEs to ensure
the amended § 5H1.12 remains effective. Because the ACEs phenomenon is largely a twenty-first
century creation, and much more research on the subject can be anticipated, the Commission may
need to make further amendments to § 5H1.12 in the future. With this, however, the Commission
will need to balance making further amendments to align with the current research and ensuring
that sentencing courts are provided with predictable and thoroughly considered guidelines. 124
V. CONCLUSION
There is ample evidence to suggest that ACEs are not only a relevant consideration for
equitable and consistent sentencing determinations, but also a necessary consideration. The
current federal sentencing process, consisting of the Guidelines, statutes, and court precedent, is
incoherent and sentencing determinations are beginning to look as they did prior to the SRA—
unfair and unpredictable. Amending the Guidelines to permit consideration of ACEs in sentencing
determinations would begin to resolve this incoherency and it would add legitimacy to the
sentencing process by acknowledging the largely undeniable relationship between childhood
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trauma, adult criminality, and reduced culpability. While the stakes of sentencing are so high, a
deficient system cannot persist.
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